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HOW ARE PREGNANT WOMEN VULNERABLE RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS? 
VERINA WILD 
 
 
Abstract 
Despite the attempts to promote the inclusion of pregnant women into clinical research, this 
group is still widely excluded. An analysis of the “vulnerability of pregnant women” that 
questions deeply internalized stereotypes is necessary for finding the right balance in the 
protection of pregnant women as research participants. Criticism of the traditional account of 
vulnerability will lead to an alternative that focuses on situations rather than groups and on the 
obligations of responsible parties. The paper adds to the current general discussion of 
vulnerability and at the same time addresses the specific problem of drug treatment during 
pregnancy.  
 
 
Introduction 
Despite the attempts to promote the inclusion of pregnant women in clinical research, this 
group is still widely excluded and thus hindered in benefiting from medical progress (Lyerly, 
Little, and Faden 2009). There are two interconnected reasons why pregnant women continue to 
be excluded from clinical trials. First, the traditional background assumptions associated with 
pregnancy, pregnant women, and the fetus still involve a harmful separation of woman and fetus 
that in some cases leads to an unbalanced prioritization of fetal needs. The second reason is that 
pregnant women are included in the category of “vulnerable groups.” It is therefore essential to 
examine and reassess the general understanding of “pregnancy” and “vulnerability” in order to 
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develop an ethically sound approach to the question of pregnant women’s participation in clinical 
trials. Appropriate safeguards—for example in order to avoid fetal harm—can only be 
implemented once this reassessment is convincing and successful.  
Part I describes how pregnant women were first excluded from participation in clinical 
trials and how then regulatory bodies allowed their inclusion again. Voices from Germany will 
be used as examples showing the problems of linking vulnerability to the decision-making 
capacity of pregnant women. The main point is to show that there is still no clarity about the 
concept of the vulnerability of pregnant women. 
In Part II, the prevalent “traditional” account of vulnerability—which is connected to 
voluntary informed consent—will be explored and rejected for pregnant women. In parallel, the 
understanding of pregnancy is reassessed and the concept of the “double unit” is developed.  
In Part III, an alternative account of vulnerability, understood as exposure to increased 
likelihood of harm, will be developed, based on a) the insights gained in the previous sections; 
and b) selected elements of earlier works on vulnerability. This will lead to the following 
approach to recognition of special vulnerabilities, such as those that may arise in pregnancy: In 
the context of biomedical research, vulnerability arises in those situations which might lead to an 
increased likelihood of harm for some potential research participants. It is the obligation of 
those responsible for clinical trials to identify these situations that generate vulnerability and to 
develop appropriate safeguards against the increased risk of harms resulting from those 
situations. This alternative account of vulnerability requires three central elements: 1) 
vulnerabilities are context-dependent, dynamic, and situational; 2) for greater clarity and to avoid 
wrongful labeling, situations with an increased likelihood of harm should be clearly identified; 
and, 3) the detection of such situations must result in defining the subsequent obligations of those 
who are responsible for the trial. 
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This paper will discuss the case of clinical research on pregnant women in order to enrich 
the ongoing conceptual discussion in research ethics about “vulnerability.”  
Pregnant women as research participants and the open question of vulnerability 
 
In 1954, the German company Chemie Grünenthal GmbH developed the drug 
Contergan® (Thalidomide) and sold it to a total of forty-six countries. At that time, there was no 
regulatory requirement for clinical trials prior to the approval of drugs. In the early 1960s, 
physicians started detecting malformed extremities of children born to women who had taken 
Contergan® during pregnancy (Lenz et al. 1962; Marquardt 1994; McBride 1961). Trading of 
the drug was stopped by November 1961.  
On the one hand, the so-called “fall of man after a careless use of therapeutic drugs” 
(Müller-Oerlinghausen 2005, 33) led to the groundbreaking implementation of regulations for 
general pharmaceutical trials. On the other hand, this incidence caused a major turn concerning 
drug therapy during pregnancy: “Then came the Thalidomide catastrophe—and suddenly the 
world was aware that the human embryo was not sequestered in an impervious maternal body 
where it was shielded from all but genetic harm” (Wilson 1979, 205). From then on, a widely 
practiced and legally mandated exclusion of pregnant women from clinical trials (FDA 1977) 
took place.  
However, this mandated exclusion led to therapeutic difficulties during pregnancy (e.g., 
Caschetta, Chavkin, and McGovern 1993; Scott and Purohit 1989). Increasingly it was 
understood that the lack of evidence to support therapeutic decisions in caring for pregnant 
women was due to the ongoing exclusion of pregnant women from clinical trials. Hence, the 
argument for including pregnant women in clinical trials accelerated in the United States in the 
early 1990s (Caschetta, Chavkin, and McGovern 1993; Merkatz et al. 1993). From an ethical 
perspective, the notion of “vulnerability” of pregnant women in the context of clinical research 
was rejected, because there was no reason to believe that pregnant women could not make 
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autonomous decisions or that pregnant women were particularly prone to being exploited 
(Anderson 1994; Macklin 1994; Mastroianni, Faden, and Federman 1994).  
As a significant result of that debate, since 2001 various regulations have been changed to 
mandate the inclusion of pregnant women in clinical trials under certain circumstances. Among 
these were the U.S. regulation (HHS 2009), the “Additional Protocol to the Convention on 
Human Rights and Biomedicine, concerning Biomedical Research” of the Council of Europe 
(Council of Europe 2005), and the CIOMS guidelines (CIOMS 2002). Whereas the Council of 
Europe and the CIOMS do not clarify the concept of vulnerability in the context of pregnancy, 
the influential U.S. regulations explicitly label pregnant women as a vulnerable population: 
“When some or all of the subjects are likely to be vulnerable to coercion or undue influence, such 
as children, prisoners, pregnant women, mentally disabled persons, or economically or 
educationally disadvantaged persons, additional safeguards have been included in the study to 
protect the rights and welfare of these subjects” (HHS 2009).  
Despite the regulatory mandates to include pregnant women into clinical research, little 
has changed. Even for relatively common conditions Cochrane Collaboration Reviews conclude 
that there is insufficient data to recommend any specific drug treatment, either due to small 
sample sizes (e.g., urinary tract infections: Vazquez and Abalos 2011), because no randomized 
clinical trials exist (e.g., deep vein thrombosis: Che Yakoob et al. 2010), or because there is a 
general lack of high-quality evidence to back up any advice (e.g., nausea and vomiting: 
Matthews et al. 2010). In total, only about a dozen drugs have been approved for use during 
pregnancy, and more than half of these drugs have had their approval rescinded (Haire 2001). 
Because of the lack of evidence about safe and effective drug treatments during pregnancy, a 
recent “second wave” of bioethicists has criticized the ongoing exclusion of pregnant women 
from clinical trials (Lyerly, Little, and Faden 2008; Lyerly, Little, and Faden 2009). 
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The example of Germany 
It is not only in official regulations that one can find the labeling of pregnant women as a 
vulnerable group. The public debate in Germany serves as an example that shows how 
vulnerability is routinely attributed to pregnant women and that it is widely connected to the 
decision-making capacity of pregnant women. 
In Germany, no national law explicitly regulates research on pregnant women. Thus, the 
above-mentioned Additional Protocol to the European Convention is currently the only 
instrument regulating clinical trials during pregnancy. Notwithstanding, pregnant women are—as 
in many other countries—frequently excluded from clinical research. In 2003, German 
bioethicists raised the question of whether the current exclusion of pregnant women from clinical 
trials is an appropriate protection or whether it is in fact a form of paternalistic and harmful 
overprotection (Biller-Andorno and Wild 2003a; 2003b). Leading reproductive toxicologists 
responded to the bioethicists’ concerns with extensive criticisms and concluded that a 
liberalization of the exclusion of pregnant women from clinical trials was not necessary or 
desirable (Schaefer, Spielmann, and Vetter 2004). From their point of view, collecting 
retrospective data was sufficient for the improvement of medical treatment during pregnancy and 
feminist claims could not justify research on pregnant women: “It is not permissible to make a 
pregnant woman responsible for an experiment which she cannot judge sufficiently. The 
reference to the argument of equality . . . seeks to justify the potentially risky testing of 
questionably beneficial drugs with an emancipatory pretension” (A166, my translation). 
This quotation raises important issues for the question of vulnerability. In their first 
argument, the authors take away pregnant women's right to decide whether to participate in trials, 
claiming that they cannot sufficiently evaluate an experiment. Even if the authors do not 
explicitly say so, the implication is that pregnant women lack the capacity to judge a complex 
situation adequately. Thus, the authors distinguish pregnant women and their decision-making 
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capacity from that of nonpregnant women and men, who unquestionably have the right to decide 
upon participation in a clinical trial. 
The author’s second argument refers to gender justice. In their paper, Biller-Andorno and 
Wild had attempted to initiate a debate on whether the exclusion of pregnant women is 
overprotective and thus harmful (Biller-Andorno and Wild 2003a). But Schaefer, Spielmann, and 
Vetter rejected this first attempt at critically assessing the status quo in Germany, dismissing it on 
the grounds that gender equity (“an emancipatory pretension”) is secondary to protecting 
pregnant women against the possible risks of clinical trials.  
In this short quotation, one can see the strong reluctance to acknowledge pregnant women 
as competent and autonomous decision makers and to acknowledge the call for equity in the case 
of clinical research. Instead, the dominant concern was to protect pregnant women (or possibly 
more importantly, the fetus) from any kind of risk resulting from clinical trials. This quotation is 
an excellent example to show how the general labeling of pregnant women as a “vulnerable 
group” needing protection from clinical research precludes further discussion and possible 
improvement in the area of therapeutic evidence during pregnancy. 
A German bioethicist argued similarly in an expert opinion of the federal Enquête 
Commission “Ethics and Law in Modern Medicine”: 
Research on pregnant women that risks damage to an embryo cannot be justified by 
arguments about the autonomy of pregnant women and knowledge gaps concerning 
teratogenicity of drugs alone. It is impermissible to shift the responsibility for the risk-
benefit-assessment from the researchers to the research participants. In contrast to the 
researchers, the research participants cannot adequately judge the consequences of an 
experimental therapy. (Bobbert 2004, 56, my translation) 
Like Schaefer, Spielmann, and Vetter, Bobbert refers to the autonomy and decision-making 
capacity of pregnant women and explicitly states that pregnant women cannot adequately judge 
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the situation. Thus she also distinguishes pregnant women from non-pregnant women or men by 
saying that in this special case the potential participants cannot judge the potential risks. The line 
of argumentation is surprising, since it should never be the participant's responsibility to perform 
the risk–benefit assessment prior to a clinical trial in the first place. Instead, it is the obligation of 
researchers and Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) to assess the risk–benefit ratio and to inform 
the participant, who then makes her informed choice. This is the standard procedure, which 
should apply to pregnant or non-pregnant individuals alike. To make an exception for pregnant 
women and to protect them from any possible risk means to attribute a vulnerability to pregnant 
women (or their fetus), which the authors justify by ascribing an insufficient decisional capacity 
to pregnant women. 
The categorical exclusion of pregnant women from clinical trials remains unquestioned in 
Germany, as examples from the academic literature and the media illustrate. In a study on 
antibiotics in pregnancy the author claimed, “It goes without saying that clinical trials on 
pregnant women are forbidden for ethical reasons” (Imhof 2005, 5, my translation). During the 
H1N1 epidemic in 2009, journalists wrote: “Vaccination . . . has not been tested on pregnant 
women at all. Clinical research on pregnant women is classified as unethical” (Winkelheide 
2009, my translation); and “But pregnant women are excluded from this test phase, as they are 
from any other clinical trial” (Langemak 2009, 1, my translation). A section of the German 
Health Ministry wrote on their homepage, “Clinical trials prior to the approval for H5N1 
vaccination have not been conducted on pregnant women for ethical reasons” (Paul-Ehrlich-
Institut 2009, my translation).  
These remarks show how readily accepted the exclusion of pregnant women seems to be 
for unspecified “ethical reasons.” If no fundamental discussion takes place regarding underlying 
background assumptions about the “vulnerability” of pregnant women and the concept of 
“pregnancy,” then little will change in the future. An explicit analysis that is able to question 
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deeply internalized stereotypes is necessary in order to find the right balance between over- and 
underprotection of pregnant women in the context of clinical trials. In the next section, therefore, 
I will further elucidate the underlying concepts.  
The “traditional” understanding of vulnerability  
Which arguments support the classification of pregnant women as vulnerable? In order to 
answer this question it is necessary to know what is generally understood as “vulnerability” in 
the context of biomedical research, independent of pregnant women. Unfortunately, this is the 
very question that leads to disagreement (Coleman 2009; Hurst 2008; Levine et al. 2004; Ruof 
2004). However, in many accounts of vulnerability, as in the U.S. guidelines or in the 
Declaration of Helsinki, two criteria that are connected to voluntary informed consent are used to 
justify special protection for certain groups or populations: impaired decision-making capacity, 
and risk of exploitation.1 Both criteria imply that these groups are vulnerable to greater harm 
through participation in clinical trials than other nonvulnerable groups. There are voices that 
criticize this account of vulnerability (Coleman 2009; Hurst 2008; Kipnis 2006; Luna 2009; 
Macklin 1994; Wild 2010), but it is nevertheless far from resolved. This “traditional view” is, in 
fact, still prevalent and effective, and should therefore be evaluated regarding the special case of 
pregnant women. An explicit discussion and criticism of this understanding is useful in order to 
develop a well-balanced understanding of vulnerability. 
Decisional incapacity 
Assumed limited capacity for decision making is a dominant argument for special 
protection and—as we have seen—even exclusion of the group of pregnant women from clinical 
trials. What needs to be explained is whether the assumed limitation is in the capacity of 
pregnant women to make decisions, or in the capacity of the fetus. While Beauchamp and 
Childress argue in their newest edition of Principles of Biomedical Ethics that pregnant women 
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are not vulnerable per se (Beauchamp and Childress 2009, 254), in the newly added chapter on 
vulnerability the fetus is explicitly mentioned as a prototypical example of a member of a 
vulnerable group. Taking up this division between pregnant woman and the fetus, the argument 
of limited capacity of decision making could be understood in the two following ways:  
Possibility 1: The fetus cannot give consent. This leads to the vulnerability of pregnant 
women as research participants.  
Possibility 2: The pregnant woman’s decision-making capacity is impaired. This leads to 
the vulnerability of pregnant women as research participants. 
I will demonstrate that neither of these versions of vulnerability is sound. It is 
inappropriate to separate the pregnant women and the fetus as single units of concern. An explicit 
understanding and explanation of the concept of “pregnancy” and “pregnant women” is essential 
in order to continue with an appropriate discussion of vulnerability in the context of clinical 
research for the special case of pregnant women.  
 Possibility 1: Because a fetus cannot give consent, we might infer an ethical imperative 
for third parties to protect the fetus from harm. If so, we must clarify whether it is appropriate to 
examine the decision-making capacity of the fetus alone as if he or she existed as a person, and if 
so, who the relevant third party is to make a substituted judgment. If the fetus is regarded as an 
individual “person,” then an individual moral status with individual rights, for example equal to 
children's rights, is plausible.  
In line with an extensive body of feminist writings, I criticize this approach and argue for 
a nonisolated and nonindividualized position of the fetus as being an integral part of the pregnant 
woman's body. The ongoing generalized exclusion of pregnant women from clinical trials shows 
that it is necessary to reintroduce the central insights of the feminist view on the concept of 
pregnancy and consider them anew in the context of clinical research. 
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The problematic “fetal individualization” and separation from the mother has been 
described as a consequence of technological innovations, namely visualization in medicine (see 
Duden 1994; Meredith 2005; Schindele 1990; Schneider 1995). Wiesemann emphasizes that it 
was in great part the photographer Lennart Nilsson who created the picture of the fetus as an 
independent individual by publishing his artificially manipulated pictures in the 1960s (2006, 
77–78, referring to Nilsson 1965). By using dead fetuses, he produced the putative and illusory 
idea of an independent unborn child. The visualization of the fetus as an individual is hence an 
artificial construct that leads to a one-sided focus on the fetus. This occurred together with an 
emphasis on fetal rights on the one hand and the anonymization of the “surrounding” mother and 
loss of sight of women's rights on the other (Schindele 1990; Schneider 1995; Stormer 2003).  
What does this mean for the personal status and moral rights of a fetus? In relation to the 
debate on abortion, Sherwin presents two lines of argument. She differentiates between feminist 
and nonfeminist argumentation. The former puts the woman in the center of attention; the latter 
focuses on the moral status of the fetus: 
The most obvious difference between feminist and non-feminist approaches to abortion 
can be seen in the relative attention each gives to the interests and experiences of women 
in its analysis. Feminists consider it self-evident that the pregnant woman is a subject of 
principal concern in abortion decisions. In most non-feminist accounts, however, not only 
is she not perceived as central, she is rendered virtually invisible. Non-feminist theorists, 
whether they support or oppose women’s right to choose abortion, focus almost all their 
attention on the moral status of the developing embryo or the fetus. (Sherwin 1998, 375)  
Sherwin makes this distinction in the context of abortion, which may differ from the case of 
clinical trials. In the case of abortion, the concern is the woman's decision whether to end her 
pregnancy; in the case of research, frequently the women concerned want to bring their 
pregnancies to term and most likely have a strong interest in protecting their fetuses and future 
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children from harm. Sherwin's distinction is nevertheless helpful for the case of pregnant 
women's decision-making capacity in the context of clinical research because it emphasizes the 
above-mentioned problematic individualization of the fetus that leads to the central questioning 
of its moral status. The feminist view focuses on the decisional capacity of the woman and 
rejects a separation of woman and fetus as two parties with competing rights.  
A fitting concept is thus to conceive of woman and fetus categorically as a “double unit,” 
consisting of two parts, the woman and the unborn child, and for which the woman is the only 
person who can and should make a decision. The bodily connectedness between mother and 
fetus and the resulting intimate relation constitute a unique bond. Such a close relation in which 
one part (the mother) provides the necessary condition for the coming into existence of the other 
(the fetus) does not exist in any other form of human relationships. All the woman's decisions 
affect her as the “double unit.” Mackenzie puts the uniqueness of the double unit into words: 
The experience of pregnancy, particularly in the early stages, is unique in the sense that it 
defies a sharp opposition between self and other. . . . The foetus, to the extent that it is 
experienced as part of the woman’s body, is also experienced as part of her self, but as a 
part that is also other than herself. . . . It is a being, both inseparable and yet separate from 
her, both part of and yet soon to be independent from her. (Mackenzie 1992, 148) 
Because the fetus is part of the double unit for which the woman has the decisional capacity, it is 
not appropriate to speak of the fetus as an isolated individual. Its status is therefore not 
comparable to any other individual incapable of making autonomous decisions, who might 
deserve individualized protection from third parties. Following this line of argument, possibility 
one (The fetus cannot give consent. This leads to the vulnerability of pregnant women as 
research participants) can be rejected.  
 Possibility 2: According to both Schaefer and Bobbert (see above), pregnant women 
cannot decide about the risks of trials, and given the risks of potential harms to the fetus, on their 
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account trials are not morally justifiable. For them, the argument of the decisional incapacity of 
the woman seems to rule out the possibility of clinical trials with pregnant participants 
altogether. But why should a woman, who is principally capable of making her own decisions—
even in risky situations—not have the ability to do so during pregnancy? A few studies have 
investigated the decision-making capacity of pregnant women (Dorantes, Tait, and Naughton 
2000; Rodger et al. 2003). These studies show that there can be certain situations, as when the 
woman feels strong pain or during labor and childbirth, when pregnant women might experience 
limited decision-making capacity. Further, situations might occur when the decision-making 
capacity is impaired due to psychiatric conditions, drug abuse, or medical conditions like coma.2 
But there is no reasonable argument to conclude that pregnancy itself leads to an impaired 
decision-making capacity of the woman. Interviews show that the feeling of “double 
responsibility” sometimes leads to even more reflective and prudential decision making (Wild 
2010, 135). Hurst therefore rightly calls the classification of pregnant women as vulnerable on 
the grounds of an impaired decision-making capacity “stereotyping and insulting” (Hurst 2008). 
From an empirical point of view, but also from a theoretical standpoint, there are no reasons to 
conclude that just because a woman is pregnant, her decision-making capacity is impaired. 
Possibility two (The pregnant woman’s decision-making capacity is impaired. This leads to the 
vulnerability of pregnant women as research participants) can therefore also be rejected. 
Both possibilities one and two have been rejected. As a conclusion, it is not possible to 
classify pregnant women as a vulnerable group on the grounds of a generalized decisional 
incapacity. Instead, some situations have been identified that might lead to a certain 
vulnerability. Despite this finding, however, an alternative understanding of vulnerability has not 
been developed. Nor is the description of a double unit explicit enough concerning whether 
anyone should feel responsible for fetal well-being in the context of clinical research, and if so, 
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who and why. Both issues—an alternative understanding of vulnerability, and responsibility for 
the fetus—will be taken up later in this paper. 
Higher risk of exploitation 
Increased risk of exploitation is another classic criterion for vulnerability and is also 
connected to informed consent. It might apply to people who cannot decide voluntarily for or 
against participation in a clinical trial, if they are under constraints or external pressure to decide 
in favor of participation. In principle, all the reasons irrespective of pregnancy that one can think 
of as leading to a higher risk of exploitation can also occur during pregnancy: language 
difficulties, poverty, low formal education, or specific hierarchical constellations. But these 
reasons for vulnerability are—like impaired decision-making capacity—prevalent only in certain 
situations and in certain contexts. They are clearly not generalizable for all pregnant women. 
Situations that occur only during pregnancy might also lead to a higher risk of exploitation, for 
example, in situations in which the pregnant woman feels moral pressure to do what is best for 
her child. Findings from a British interview study (Mohanna 1997) as well as results from my 
prior research support this claim (Wild 2010). In qualitative interviews, I asked thirty pregnant 
women whether they would participate in a trial that tests a new hormone that might prevent 
preterm birth even though the women will probably suffer from severe nausea. Whereas the 
women were very reluctant about most other study scenarios (with benefit for themselves), 
almost all of them readily agreed to participate in such a study for the benefit of the fetus. In 
many cases, the women emphasized their will and wish to do the best for their unborn child, even 
if that interfered with their own needs. Hence, in a risky study with great potential benefit for the 
fetus, some women might overlook or downplay the risks to themselves, but clearly more 
research is needed on this issue. Thus, studies advertising a substantial benefit for the fetus might 
lead to potentially exploitative situations, thereby necessitating special safeguards related to this 
 14 
vulnerability. However, this specific type of vulnerability is, again, situational. It is only relevant 
in the setting of a trial with significant benefits for the fetus and risks to the woman. 
So far I have shown that an oversimplified generalization of the group of pregnant 
women as being vulnerable on the traditional approach has been misleading. It has led to a 
paternalistic and stigmatizing exclusion from research of the entire group of pregnant women. 
The aim of this paper is to build on the criticism of the traditional concept of vulnerability in 
order to develop a more balanced approach and responses to vulnerability. But before moving on 
to this step, clarification is necessary regarding whether the existence of the fetus—as part of the 
double unit—has any effect on the ethical evaluation of participation of pregnant women in 
clinical research. 
Responsibility for fetal well-being 
If pregnant women can be vulnerable in the context of clinical research—and I will 
conclude that they can be in certain situations—what role does the fetus play? The concept of a 
double unit suggests that it is inappropriate to individualize the fetus. It grounds criticism of a 
one-sided focus on potential fetal harms together with neglect of the harmful consequences this 
can have, in turn, for the woman. This approach also establishes that the pregnant woman is the 
person who should make the ultimate decisions concerning herself (as the double unit). 
However, being characterized as a double unit also implies the trivial insight that 
pregnant women are different from nonpregnant individuals because of their pregnancy. As I 
will show in the next section, various reasons might lead to a certain kind of vulnerability, even if 
the pregnant woman is seen as a double unit, and a separation of the fetus from her as an 
independent unit of concern is rejected, and even if she is considered to have full autonomy.  
Further, just because a separation of pregnant women and fetus is inadequate, this does 
not mean that all responsibility toward the fetus rests upon the woman. One important insight 
from the feminist view is that relations matter. In the case of clinical trials it is obvious that the 
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unique relationship, or bond, between pregnant women and their fetuses matters. But so does the 
relationship between the father and the pregnant woman (and her fetus), as well as that of the 
clinical researchers toward her (and her fetus).  
Many clinical trials would probably include pregnant women who plan to bring the 
pregnancy to term. Thus the fetus should be regarded as her (or someone else’s) future child and 
that is why its well-being matters morally. As Mackenzie claims, “in a context in which some 
one or more members of the moral community have decided to take parental responsibility for its 
[the fetus’s] future well-being, it [the fetus] has moral significance by virtue of its relations with 
her or them” (Mackenzie 1992, 143). If parental responsibility has been established, it is the 
researchers’ duty to respect this and therefore to care for the fetus’s well-being.  
A researcher who designs a study in which a pregnant woman shall participate must see 
her as a double unit, that is, neither only as a woman or only as a fetus, nor both as two separate 
units of concern. If the fetus is harmed, for example because a preterm birth results from a 
clinical trial, this will affect the woman too. And if a woman suffers from side effects of a drug, 
for example by developing severe nausea, her fetus will also be affected. The risk–benefit 
assessment of a trial must consider harm to the woman in connection to the fetus and vice versa.  
It would thus be laudable to design a study that tests an off-label drug in a randomized 
clinical trial, which compares two antihypertensive drugs widely used during pregnancy, in 
pregnant women who suffer from gestational hypertension and are already being treated. Such a 
study would enhance therapeutic evidence for the use of those drugs during pregnancy and could 
ultimately lead to official drug approval for use in pregnancy. After being well informed about 
the potential risks of the trial, it would be the pregnant women’s decision whether to participate 
or not. 
But it would not be justifiable to set up a call for healthy pregnant women who want to 
bring their pregnancies to term to participate in a study that tests Thalidomide. The researcher 
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would knowingly create a hazard for the double unit that would not be outweighed by potential 
therapeutic benefits. This would clearly be an ill-designed study that would violate a main ethical 
regulation for clinical research, namely that “Medical research involving human subjects may 
only be conducted if the importance of the objective outweighs the inherent risks and burdens to 
the research subjects” (Helsinki Declaration 2008). 
In conclusion, the researcher self-evidently has a responsibility toward the well-being of 
the fetus as soon as parental responsibility might be or has been established. But the fetus can 
only be considered a part of the woman, who is—after being properly informed—the person with 
the ensuing right to decide whether or not she wants to participate in the trial. 
A balanced application of “vulnerability” in the context of clinical research  
In this section I want to show what can be learned from the example of pregnant women 
for understanding “vulnerability” in the context of clinical research. An appropriate account 
should be balanced and should prevent an overly permissive attitude, while at the same time it 
should avoid any kind of victimization, stigmatization, or harmful labeling that would lead to an 
overly protective stance.  
By drawing on elements of seminal works (esp. Hurst 2008; Levine et al. 2004; Luna 
2009), I will argue that vulnerability in the context of biomedical research remains a valid 
concept. However, vulnerability should not be generally assigned to certain groups, as the 
example of pregnant women has shown. Instead, I suggest a shift of focus away from groups to 
situations that individual participants might find themselves in, and also to the responsibility of 
researchers. Hence, the following approach to understanding special vulnerabilities in 
biomedical research: In the context of biomedical research, vulnerability arises in those 
situations which might lead to an increased likelihood of harm for some potential research 
participants. It is the obligation of those responsible for clinical trials to identify these situations 
 17 
that generate vulnerability and to develop appropriate safeguards against the increased risk of 
harms resulting from those situations. 
It is necessary to specify precisely what this approach means in order to ultimately ensure 
a balanced protection of individuals. The following central elements of an adequate approach to 
vulnerability result from my criticism of the traditional account of vulnerability: 1) 
vulnerabilities are context-dependent, dynamic, and situational; 2) for greater clarity and to avoid 
wrongful labeling, situations with an increased likelihood of harm should be clearly identified; 
and, 3) the detection of such situations must result in defining the subsequent obligations of those 
who are responsible for the trial. 
Vulnerabilities are context-dependent, dynamic, and situational 
Today, many authors agree that vulnerability in clinical research should be understood as 
context-dependent and dynamic and not as a static definition aimed at targeting and permanently 
labeling certain groups (Levine et al. 2004; Luna 2009; Wild 2010). As a dynamic concept, 
vulnerability is situational and can change as the context and situation change. This calls for 
context-sensitivity and an explicit description of the given situation.  
In the case of pregnant women, context-sensitivity requires explicit clarity about the 
understanding of the participant, including an understanding of the maternal–fetal relationship. I 
have treated this topic above and proposed an understanding of the pregnant woman and her 
fetus as a double unit for which the woman can and should make decisions. A dynamic 
conception of vulnerability also calls for detecting situations in which an increased likelihood of 
risk might occur. This will be elucidated in the next section.  
A dynamic understanding further suggests that every potential research participant could 
come into situations with an increased likelihood of harm. This does not weaken the concept of 
vulnerability. Rather, I argue that researchers or IRBs are thereby forced to carefully examine the 
context in which the study is taking place and the situation in which the potential study 
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participant is being placed, in order to detect real and existing vulnerabilities more specifically. 
Only then can appropriate safeguards be implemented and the balance achieved between too 
much and too little protection. 
Identification of potential situations with an increased likelihood of harm 
The context-sensitive understanding of vulnerability entails that the attribution of 
somebody as being vulnerable is inappropriate. Instead, what matters is the surrounding context 
to which somebody might be vulnerable: persons or entire groups can only come into situations 
where they become vulnerable to certain harms (Coleman 2009; Hurst 2008). To understand that 
persons can be vulnerable to something strengthens the fact that the surrounding—and not the 
“label”—counts (Kipnis 2006; Luna 2009). It fosters the obligation of those responsible for 
clinical trials to detect and clearly name the specific situation that brings about possible harms. 
But how should somebody who is responsible for the conduct of a clinical trial actually identify 
such situations? Luna’s development of “layers not labels” regarding vulnerability is helpful in 
this regard (Luna 2009). But what Luna explicitly rejects is any form of categorization in order to 
detect vulnerabilities.  
In contrast, I believe that a rough guide outlining where to search for such situations with 
an increased likelihood of harm would be useful. For this purpose, I appreciate the approach 
developed by Levine et al. (2004), Hurst (2008), and Coleman (2009). Levine et al. identify three 
types of research protocols that might deserve special scrutiny. Here, the research situation (and 
not the potential participant or group) is the center of attention, for example, in the case of testing 
new drugs or interventions with possible irreversible effects or when there is a credible risk of 
significant harm. Hurst searches for potential wrongs3 that could occur while participating in a 
trial. She develops a four-step approach that includes the search for potential research subjects at 
risk of being wronged, the identification of subjects who might be more likely to be harmed than 
others, the question whether the given IRB is among those who share the duty to minimize or 
 19 
avoid the wrong, and the identification of possible steps to react in an appropriate way. Coleman 
distinguishes between risk-based, consent-based, and justice-based vulnerabilities (2009). These 
categories are helpful, but it is important to use them for the identification of situations that lead 
to increased risk of harm rather than vulnerabilities. The latter might again run the risk of 
labeling groups instead of shifting the focus to the actual situation and the resulting responsibility 
for the researchers and the IRBs. 
The following categories—risk, choice, and injustice—should not be understood as static 
and exclusive; they can overlap. Hence, these three categories should only serve as the required 
rough guide in order to better detect situations of increased likelihood of harm. 
First, some study designs might show a significantly unfavorable risk–benefit ratio, 
which can lead to situations that render potential participants vulnerable. In such cases, special 
safeguards can be appropriate. The fact that some interventions and drugs might harm pregnant 
women and their fetuses significantly more than others might lead to such a significantly 
increased risk with no justifiable benefit, for example, in the above-mentioned case of a trial 
testing Thalidomide on healthy pregnant women who want to bring their pregnancy to term. 
Thus it may well be that some studies justify an adaptation of the study design or even the 
exclusion of pregnant participants. 
One could also find applications of this understanding that would exclude diabetics from 
a clinical trial. For example, it might be appropriate to adapt a study design or even ban 
participation for this specific group, if the drug or intervention under investigation could 
seriously affect the blood glucose level. Unlike pregnant women, diabetics are not traditionally 
listed as a vulnerable group and yet both might be potentially placed in situations where special 
protection is justified. This example shows the particular importance of the situation in making 
members of one group at increased likelihood of harm (i.e., vulnerable) in the context in 
question. 
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Hence, even if potential participants capable of giving consent (such as pregnant women 
or diabetics) are taken seriously as full moral agents whose autonomy is respected and who can 
participate in decision making, they might still be susceptible to situations where they are 
rendered vulnerable due to a significantly increased risk when compared to other potential study 
participants.  
Many situations with an increased likelihood of risk of harm are not specific to pregnant 
women, and can also apply to other persons or groups. It will be difficult to find the appropriate 
threshold for such an increased level of risk that justifies adaptation of the study design or even 
exclusion of certain participants. The challenge is to specifically detect and explain situations 
with such an unfavorable risk–benefit ratio and not to systematically rule out an entire group as 
potential participants in clinical trials. 
Second, a situation of vulnerability connected to choice can apply in a range of 
circumstances. Some people are not as able as others to refuse participation in a trial, for 
example due to coma, intense pain, age (e.g., newborns), or in case of some mental illnesses. 
Others are not as free. This occurs in situations in which adequate freedom to choose is lacking, 
because participants may be in circumstances that increase the potential for exploitation. This 
could be the case, for example, when people are in desperate need of treatment and cannot 
otherwise afford it, in certain hierarchical constellations, or when freedom is limited (e.g., for a 
prisoner or an asylum-seeker in certain countries). Other situations of exploitation can occur if 
there is lack of information, a language barrier, or financial incentives. 
Searching for vulnerabilities connected to restricted choices calls to mind the traditional 
understanding of vulnerability. However, that understanding aims at identifying groups that fall 
under these categories. Identifying situations instead of groups focuses attention upon the 
specific context, and this ultimately leads to a more sensitive and nuanced understanding of the 
obligations that result for the researcher. Even in the case of an “intrinsically vulnerable” person 
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like a woman in a coma or a newborn, what should be important for the researcher is the specific 
situation into which this intrinsically vulnerable person is brought. In examining the situation, 
questions arise regarding the kind of research being performed, what harm can be done to the 
potential participant, and—since the research and the researcher are essential elements of the 
situation examined—which obligations follow from this analysis for the researcher.  
Regarding pregnancy, most of these choice-related situations are not pregnancy-specific. 
However, in the case of pregnant women we have seen that a study with significant expected 
benefits for the fetus and substantial burden for the pregnant woman might lead to the strong 
wish to participate in the trial without fully weighing risks and benefits. Such a situation, which 
might affect a woman’s decision making, needs to be detected and appropriate actions have to be 
taken. This could be, for example, the requirement to assign an independent expert (e.g., a 
psychologist or clinical ethicist) to talk about the risks and benefits in more detail with the 
women. 
Third, situations creating potential vulnerability should not be understood solely as 
sporadic or temporary circumstances. Situations that render someone vulnerable could also be 
due to structural circumstances and systematic disadvantage, for example when certain persons 
or groups—like the group of pregnant women—are continuously and unjustly excluded from 
meaningful studies. In this situation, a person or group is rendered vulnerable by structural 
exclusion, which deprives them from participating in the benefits of medical progress. 
Researchers should then implement safeguards against unjust exclusion, or should at least have 
to justify why they do not include these persons or groups.  
Another example of structural injustice includes discrimination against certain persons or 
groups for the sake of research and with this the perpetuation of their disadvantageous 
circumstances. If, for example, a study systematically targets only poor or homeless participants, 
even though the research is not addressed to their needs, potential participants might be brought 
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into a situation of increased likelihood of harm through the conduct of the trial. Researchers’ 
obligations start with the recognition of this systematic injustice and should lead to a constructive 
solution, for example ensuring the participation of alternative groups, or changing the design and 
setting of the trial altogether. 
Determining the obligations that result for researchers 
The context-dependent approach, with its focus on specific situations, is incomplete 
without a determination of the obligations of those responsible for setting up a clinical trial. What 
is essential is the active role of the responsible counterpart. Hence, in the context of clinical 
research, the detection of situations that might lead to vulnerability is most important for those 
who design and conduct studies, and for those who approve them. For Goodin, recognition that 
others are vulnerable to one’s actions makes one responsible for those who are vulnerable: “It is 
vulnerability . . . that plays the crucial role in generating special responsibilities” (1985, 107). 
What matters is the obligation of the responsible others to screen for possible situations where 
vulnerabilities might occur. Further, it is important to implement the appropriate actions that 
result once a situational vulnerability has been detected (Step 4 in Hurst’s account of 
vulnerability; Hurst 2008). For example, it does not suffice to automatically exclude participants 
from clinical research altogether if a possible situation leading to vulnerability is detected. This 
would easily lead to precisely the sort of unjustified exclusion imposed upon pregnant women 
(Mastroianni, Faden, and Federman 1994). A focus on the IRB’s and researchers’ responsibility 
should foster a differentiated reaction to possible situations of vulnerability. This might 
necessitate a higher burden of detailed evaluation if special safeguards must be discussed and, 
when justified, implemented not only for each clinical trial, but potentially for each participant as 
well.  
If, for example, there is reason to believe that the risk of harm from participating in a 
specific trial is higher for pregnant women (and the fetus) than for others, this would result in 
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special obligations for those responsible for the trial. This could entail assessing the risk–benefit 
ratio more specifically, conducting more pretests, and monitoring the women or their fetuses 
more closely during the trial. It could also mean banning participation for certain trials 
altogether. This emphasis on responsibility requires researchers and IRBs to specifically explain 
the given situations and to develop the appropriate safeguards. 
Conclusion 
By discussing vulnerability and pregnancy in the context of biomedical research, this 
paper has revealed three main flaws in the traditional account of vulnerability.  
First, the traditional strategy of classifying entire groups as vulnerable has proven to be 
unspecific and harmful. Instead, the focus should be on situations that can lead to vulnerabilities 
and the resulting obligations for others.  
Second, the traditional account of vulnerability that is exclusively connected to voluntary 
and informed consent was shown to be flawed. This paper suggested that a dynamic approach 
that takes various situations connected to risk, choice, and justice into account is more suitable.  
Third, it is problematic to apply the traditional account of vulnerability to pregnant 
women. In this special case it was important to revise the understanding and background 
assumptions of the concept of “pregnancy” and “pregnant women.” An appropriate account of 
vulnerability can be applied only if the special relation between pregnant women and the fetus is 
understood. 
With this more nuanced understanding of vulnerability and pregnancy in mind, current 
regulatory approaches should be reassessed and, when indicated, revised. The overall aim should 
be improvement of the currently unacceptable situation concerning therapeutic options during 
pregnancy.  
The alternative account of vulnerability presented here is also helpful beyond the special 
case of pregnant women, as it assists in identifying vulnerability in certain situations instead of 
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paternalistically stigmatizing entire groups as incapable of giving consent. Therefore, those 
responsible for clinical trials can develop specific safeguards and thereby better assume their 
responsibility. A challenge for future research will be to properly identify situations that involve 
an “increased likelihood of harm”—thus requiring special safeguards—and to distinguish them 
from situations that do not. There will likely be complex cases for which it will remain unclear 
whether they fall under the category of creating vulnerability and whether special safeguards are 
justified. However, it is promising to pursue this path further, because the focus on ability to 
freely give consent and on special groups as criteria for determining vulnerability has failed to 
prove itself a reasonable concept in research ethics. 
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Notes 
1. See, for example, Helsinki Declaration 2008, 9: “Some research populations are 
particularly vulnerable and need special protection. These include those who cannot give or 
refuse consent for themselves and those who may be vulnerable to coercion or undue 
influence.” 
2. Situations that influence the decision-making capacity due to exploitation or coercion will 
be addressed in the next section and will also be taken up again in the last section on an 
alternative account of vulnerability. 
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3. Hurst defines vulnerability as the following: “an identifiably increased likelihood of 
incurring additional or greater wrong” (2008, 195). She explicitly restricts this definition to 
wrongs, “including wrongful harms and the wrongs that we incur when something to which 
we have a valid claim is denied us. It cannot extend to any additional harm, or any interest 
more likely to be difficult to protect, because it is not the case that we have a duty to protect 
all interests from all harms” (196).  
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